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Abstract 
Using the experiences of first and second generation migrants from three villages in Thailand, we 
'personalise' the middle income trap, seeking to understand how and why migrants with growing 
levels of education and human capital remain rooted to their natal villages. Agrarian change is such 
that the village remains the locus of familial belonging and livelihood security, limiting engagement 
with the knowledge economy, sometimes for good reason given the precarity of much non-farm 
work. We conclude that the middle-income trap for these villages in Thailand is as much personal as 
it is institutional and structural. 
 
  
1. INTRODUCING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 
It is common to hear the refrain that some countries, previously thought to be achieving a degree of 
success in development terms, have become caught in a ‘middle-income trap’.i In total there are 28 
countries which by 1987 had attained middle-income status but in 2012 still remained, seemingly 
marooned, in this middle-income category (Zhuang et al., 2012, p. 9).ii Having rapidly made the 
transition from low income to middle-income, in the process escaping the poverty trap, thirty-five 
years of further growth have failed to propel these countries into the ‘high income’ category of 
advanced economies. It is this failure which has puzzled – and concerned – development economists 
and policy-makers who have sought to understand the stickiness of development in the transition 
from middle-income to high income. Writing of the ‘tiger’ economies of Southeast Asia, Yusuf and 
Nabeshima say that the “underlying worry is that [their slowing economic performance] presages 
the beginning of a downward trend, the harbingers of which are lower rates of investment, 
persistently low rates of total factor productivity, and low levels of innovativeness… a creeping 
economic sclerosis or what some observers are calling the middle-income trap” (2009a, p. 3 
[emphasis in original]). What makes this transition from middle to high income, seemingly, so hard 
to navigate? 
 
There is no broadly agreed definition of the middle-income trap and membership of this group of 
trapped countries varies according to the definitional criteria employed. Indeed, some economists 
dispute whether there is even convincing empirical evidence that the trap itself exists (see The 
Economist, 2013). That said, academic and policy interest in the middle-income trap is significant 
and has had two attributes. First, it has focused on countries: why have countries failed to make the 
transition to high income status (see Ohno, 2009 [Vietnam]; Warr, 2011 and Somchai Jitsuchon, 
2012 [Thailand]; Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2009b [Malaysia]; and Zhuang et al., 2012 and Ajami, 2013 
[China]). The second attribute of the middle-income trap debate is that it has mainly been 
conducted within the sphere of economics, with policy-related reports being produced by agencies 
such as the Asian Development Bank (Zhuang et al., 2012; Felipe, 2012a and 2012b; Tran, 2013), the 
World Bank (Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2009b; Im and Rosenblatt, 2013), the OECD (Jankowska et al., 
2012) and the IMF (Aiyar et al., 2013), and the great majority of academic papers published in 
economics journals or business-related periodicals. These twin characteristics open up a space for an 
alternative approach, one that pays attention to how individuals and households negotiate – or do 
not – the skills/employment transition and which also looks to non-economic factors in 
understanding the causes and consequences of this apparent transition failure. After all, and as Warr 
points out (2011: 2), people can walk away from employment opportunities or can choose not to 
pursue further education. 
 
The paper that follows pursues this ‘alternative’ approach to thinking about the middle-income trap, 
one that focuses on the attributes and actions of individuals set within their family and household 
contexts and this, in turn, against the wider rural milieu. Through the lens of three villages in the 
Northeastern region of Thailand, we explore the livelihood pathways pursued over the years since 
the early 1980s, focusing on the experiences of first and second generation migrants. In this way we 
illuminate the reasons why these individuals and their households, having achieved rapidly 
expanding incomes during the early stages of Thailand’s growth, have ‘failed’ to translate this into 
further increases in income, wealth and, therefore, prosperity. As we will show, there is an 
important personal element to the middle-income trap, one which, when scaled up, goes some way 
to explaining why countries have remained trapped. The aggregate picture of countries caught 
between medium and high income status is just that: an aggregation in which the balance of 
fortunes is middle-income. To achieve high-income status thus requires a shift in this balance of 
fortunes wherein a larger proportion of the population currently working in relatively low return and 
value added work, shift into higher return and value added activities. Should this happen on a 
sufficiently wide scale, then high incomes at the aggregate, country level will be achieved. Through 
‘personalising’ – by which we mean, bringing individual and household experiences, decisions and 
outcomes into the explanatory frame – the middle-income trap, we seek to understand the multiple 
reasons, non-economic as well as economic, that shed light on the personal transitions that people 
make or, as we will show, often fail to make. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. We begin by setting out the conceptual framework. We then 
provide a short introduction to the Thailand context, the field sites themselves, and the research 
methods employed. This is followed by the presentation of the empirical results, examining first and 
second generation migrants in turn. The final substantive section of the paper relates these results 
back to the conceptual framework, suggesting some tentative policy implications, before drawing 
the paper to a conclusion. 
 
2. PERSONALISING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP: DEVELOPING A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
At its simplest level, the ‘middle-income trap’ refers to countries that experience a ‘growth slow-
down’ when they achieve middle-income status (Eichengreen et al., 2013).  More concretely, the 
term is used to describe a situation where a country lacks the human capital and state vision to 
upgrade from the stage of industrialization where technology is absorbed through foreign 
investment (classically represented by FDI-driven, low cost, low wage, labor-intensive 
manufacturing), to the stage where a domestic private sector emerges that can create technology 
(Ohno, 2009). The trap – or ‘glass ceiling’ as Ohno (2009, p. 28) calls it – is, therefore, the apparent 
inability of a country to move up the value chain where complex technologies provide the means to 
generate high value added products which, in turn, can justify higher wages. They are caught 
between low income countries, with which they cannot compete on wage cost grounds as the labor 
market tightens and wages rise, and high income countries, with which they cannot compete in 
terms of skills and technology and therefore on productivity grounds. Successfully negotiating this 
transition is critical to progressing from middle-income to high income status. In summary, the term 
‘middle-income trap’ has become an ‘empirical generalization’ to describe the stalling that seems to 
afflict countries as they move up the ladder from middle to high income (Warr, 2011, p. 4; and see 
Eichengreen et al., 2011).  
 
Of the 28 countries which were classed as middle-income in 1987 and which still remained middle-
income in 2012 (Zhuang et al., 2012, p. 9; and see Eichengreen et al., 2013), three are to be found in 
Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand (see Table 1). Thailand is said to have become 
trapped around 1994-1995 (Somchai Jitsuchon, 2012, p. 14). In Southeast Asia, only one country has 
successfully made the transition from middle to high income: Singapore, a city state of little more 
than five million people representing just one per cent of the Southeast Asian region’s total 
population (Table 1).iii Since 1987 Indonesia, the Lao PDR, Timor Leste and Vietnam have also made 
the transition from low income to middle-income and there is the question therefore of whether 
they, too, might become trapped like their richer regional neighbors. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
While these 28 middle-income countries may appear trapped, each has many individuals who have 
acquired education, are engaged in high skill and high value added employment, and have achieved 
a degree of personal wealth. The reason why the countries remain middle-income is because there 
is, along with this growing middle class, a still much more substantial proportion of the population 
who remain relatively poor and who continue to engage in low or semi-skilled activities. To be sure, 
the absolute poverty of the past has been largely eradicated and even this group of non-rich have 
achieved a significant degree of material progress. Nonetheless, high incomes for the bulk of these 
countries’ populations have remained elusive. 
 
In this paper we focus on the individuals behind the model and, in this way, attempt to theorise up 
from personal experience. Analyses of the middle-income trap tend to pay attention to the 
challenges that countries face in their efforts to move into higher value added activities as the labor 
market tightens: the need for public investment in research and education, the role of industrial 
policy, the necessity for stability in macro-economic and political environments, and a well-
functioning market system (Zhuang et al., 2012, pp. 11-14). 
 
If we look beyond these high-level enabling conditions, then the move up the value chain can be 
seen to happen in two ways, which are not mutually exclusive.  First of all, the existing labor force 
can be re-trained and re-skilled, permitting their upgrading into increasingly higher value, higher 
productivity – and therefore higher wage – employment. This was the approach that Singapore took 
in 1979 when wages were pushed up ahead of productivity through the actions of the National 
Wages Council.iv This came to be termed Singapore’s Second Industrial Revolution (see Chowdhury 
and Kirkpatrick, 1987; Rigg, 1988; Perry et al., 1997; Yeung et al., 2001). The second approach is to 
educate and skill incoming generations of workers through investment in education, especially at 
upper secondary and tertiary levels. There will be a considerable lag with this second approach 
because of the time involved in moving from educating a work force fit for low/semi-skilled factory 
work (say, 6-9 years of formal education) to one fit for developing a knowledge economy (say, 12+ 
years of education). A key question is whether this process – whichever route or combination of 
routes it takes – should be state-led or market-induced. Does the state encourage the private sector 
to move up the value chain, or does the state take the lead in this regard? It is likely, of course, that 
effective industrial policy will embrace a mix of state and market mechanisms to achieve this end, as 
well as a balance between educating the workers of the future and re-skilling current workers.  
 
We argue that understanding the barriers and inducements that individuals and households face in 
their efforts to build sustainable, rewarding and remunerative livelihoods provides a valuable insight 
into the causes of the country level middle-income trap, and also a valuable insight into the policies 
that might address the trap. Not only must states and companies stimulate, support and sustain 
upgrading, but populations must be responsive to such inducements. As we explore below, in the 
general inability of our respondents or their adult children to become high income earners, we 
identify an inter-leaving of three fields of ‘failure’ (Table 2): 
 
 The failure of the (Thai) state to develop the human capital of the population 
 The failure of firms (in Thailand) to develop the skills and/or exploit the human capital that 
exists to its full potential 
 The failure of individuals – our respondents – to develop their human capital or deploy it to 
its full potential  
 
To date most attention has been directed at the first of these fields of failure (and particularly with 
regard to education policies); some attention at the second; but very little at the third. In this paper 
we focus particularly on this third field, in the process, we suggest, providing a novel insight into the 
middle-income trap.  
  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3. THAI CONTEXT, FIELD SITES AND METHODS 
 
(a) Thailand and the field sites 
 
The Northeast of Thailand has traditionally been – and remains – the poorest region of Thailand. 
Incomes are the lowest here, and the incidence of poverty the highest. On the face of it, most of the 
region’s population live in villages and continue to farm. To meet household needs, however, they 
have, for some decades, travelled to other more prosperous parts of the country (in particular, 
Bangkok and the Central Plains) as circular labor migrants, remitting a portion of their income to 
sustain livelihoods in source settlements. While in recent years factories have begun to locate in the 
Northeast, taking advantage of the improving transport infrastructure and lower costs, migration 
remains a key livelihood strategy for many families seeking to counteract falling relative returns to 
farming and shrinking land holdings, while meeting rising needs and growing expectations. This can 
be seen, for example, in Funahashi’s (2009) 21-year panel study (1981 and 2002) of changing income 
patterns in Ban Don Daeng, situated like this study in Khon Kaen province. His study shows that over 
this two decade period the balance between village and non-village derived income shifted from 
60:40 to 20:80 (Figure 1). By 2002, and this is echoed in many other studies (Grandstaff et al., 2008; 
Shigetomi, 2004; Rigg and Salamanca 2011; Rigg et al., 2012), village livelihoods in Don Daeng had 
become dependent on income earned beyond the village. The development story that we recount 
for our three study sites is one that has resonance and purchase in many other parts of Thailand’s 
northeast region and, indeed, of other countries of Asia. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The study on which this paper is based was undertaken in three villages in Khon Kaen province: Ban 
Don, Ban Na and Ban Mai (Figure 2 and Table 3). They are, respectively, situated 58, 45 and 23 
kilometres from the provincial capital, Khon Kaen City. While access today is good, with ample public 
and private transport, before the mid-1960s the villages were only tenuously connected to the 
outside world. Since then, however, they have become progressively integrated into the national 
and global economies. This started with the introduction of cash crops from the mid-1960s 
beginning with kenaf, later replaced by cassava and, most recently, by sugarcane.v In addition to this 
on-farm diversification into various cash crops, the migration of labor into modern sectors of the 
economy from the 1970s constituted an important off-farm diversification process. While the three 
villages’ development paths were similar in these general respects, and echo the experience of other 
settlements, by the 1980s each settlement’s transition route had begun to take on a different and 
distinctive flavor. 
 
[FIGURE 2 AND TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In Ban Don, gemstone cutting emerged as an important cottage industry in the late 1980s as 
migrants who had previously worked in this industry in Bangkok returned to the village. Houses in 
Ban Don were modified to become workshops, some accommodating over 30 young gem cutters, 
many from other villages in the region. For a short while, Ban Don itself became a site of 
considerable employment and in-migration. But the village’s comparative advantage in gemstone 
cutting was short-lived and by the early 1990s this cottage industry had spread widely across the 
Northeast, and non-local gemstone workers dispersed back to their own villages, taking their skills 
and knowledge with them. The workshops returned to employing only household labor. 
 
Ban Na’s development path took a rather different route. Returning labor migrants formed small 
garment workshops, obtaining orders from factories in Bangkok to produce garment parts and 
sometimes completed products. Much like Ban Don’s gemstone workshops, today only one garment 
workshop remains in Ban Na. In Ban Mai, returning migrants formed bands of construction workers 
with complementary skill sets ranging from cement workers to carpenters and electricians. These 
teams sought out small-scale construction projects, usually involving local house building or 
renovation, itself often financed using remittances generated by migration. 
 
Although the transformation path in each village has been distinct, all share two important 
characteristics. Firstly, agriculture remained the common livelihood at a household level, even given 
considerable diversification. Secondly, although engagement with extra-village, non-farm work 
among the younger generation has remained a thread shared by many households since the 1970s, 
the range of jobs has widened. From the gemstone cutting, garment factory and construction work 
of the 1980s, young migrants from Ban Don, Ban Na and Ban Mai now work in a range of factories 
and businesses in Bangkok, Khon Kaen town and in ribbon developments that have sprung up along 
the main highways (see Table 4). 
 
The three villages conformed to the broad characterization of the Northeastern region outlined at 
the start of this section. Ban Don, Ban Mai and Ban Na were, and had been since the 1970s, 
settlements where migration was essential to sustaining livelihoods (Table 4). While at the time of 
our survey in late 2012 the large majority of households still owned land (81 per cent) and grew rice 
for home consumption (79 per cent) – which is important, as we will see – a similarly large 
proportion of households also contained family members who had temporarily migrated to work 
outside the village. Indeed, for many households the working sojourns of first generation migrants 
had been emulated by their children, who in their turn had become second generation migrants. The 
interlocking of livelihoods across space had, by around 1980, become typical of the settlements and, 
indeed, the region. For some analysts, this dislocation of families and the emergence of multi-sited 
households reliant on spatially dispersed livelihood signatures is not only characteristic of Thailand 
(and especially the Northeast) but also problematic: the “basic building blocks of local society [in 
Thailand] have taken a terrible beating [as] the income from agriculture [has] declined…families are 
scattered by migration…[and]…village populations are hollowed out” (UNDP 2007, p. 24). We do not 
share this view. Indeed, and as we will argue, it is the very social and livelihood resilience of rural 
communities which has constrained a more profound reworking and upgrading of skills, work and 
incomes.  
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As we note above, there are some aspects of our three research sites that are distinctive. 
Nonetheless, we suggest that these three villages conform to the general picture of transformation 
in the Northeastern region. The account we give resonates with Baker’s (2003) three-fold 
delineation of development in Thailand: a ‘development wave’ from the 1950s to the 1960s, during 
which successive governments attempted to increase agricultural productivity through the 
introduction of new seeds, crops and technologies; an ‘urban linkage’ wave from 1970s when 
growing demand for labor in urban areas and improvements in transport infrastructure drove a 
process of rural-urban integration; and a ‘mental’ wave from the 1990s during which aspirations and 
consumption preferences in the countryside were re-shaped by rising levels of education and 
awareness. 
 
In statistical terms when we compare the survey results to the regional profile, our households are 
close to the average in terms of size (3.95 members against a regional average 3.90), slightly 
wealthier, their farms smaller ( 1.9 ha against a regional average of 3.4 ha), and their asset profiles 
(in terms of consumer goods) more developed. Nonetheless, the direction of travel is in line with 
that recounted elsewhere (e.g. Grandstaff et al., 2008; Funahashi, 2009; Rigg and Salamanca, 2011; 
Rigg et al., 2012; Amare et al., 2012). We also contend that at a broader level still, many of the 
transformational processes – rising levels of personal mobility, diversifying and delocalising 
livelihoods, growing expectations and an intensifying need for cash, along with a continuing 
attachment to the natal village – find their echoes in studies from other Asian countries (e.g. 
Douglass, 2006; Nguyen et al., 2006; Nguyen et al., 2012; Resurreccion and Van Khanh, 2007; Xiang, 
2007; Zhu, 2007). 
 
 (b) Researching migrants and migration 
 
The study took a mixed methods approach. The first step was a survey questionnaire of 105 
households, or 28 per cent of the total households across the three villages. In addition to collecting 
baseline information on the households, their social make up and livelihoods, land and land use, and 
assets and debt, we focused particularly on gathering data on migration and migrants. This migration 
section of the questionnaire sought to identify mobility patterns and timelines by household: who 
had migrated in the past, where to, for how long, for what reason, and to undertake what sort of 
work; as well as information on remittance patterns and amounts, skills acquisition, and occupation 
on return. Here we were intent on placing individual migration experiences within the context of 
their household. 
 
Having identified the migration and mobility signatures of each surveyed household, we followed 
this up with separate, semi-structured interviews with a sub-sample of households. Through these 
interviews we collected information on the migration histories of 54 first generation migrants and 97 
second generation migrants, 151 in total. Finally, this then led us to conduct 45 unstructured 
interviews with current and past migrants themselves. In sum, then, this approach provided us with 
three discrete but interlinked sets of data and information. A quantitative household data set (n = 
105); a quantitative migrant data set (n = 151); and transcribed interviews with migrants (n =45). 
 
In addition to these three stages in the data collection, we also undertook community meetings and 
focus group discussions to complement the survey questionnaires and interviews. Finally, it is worth 
noting that our engagement with the three villages extends over more than two decades and we 
also draw on this background, contextual knowledge of development transitions in the settlements 
and the wider region to inform our discussion here. While we recognise the specificities of our 
research sites, we contend that there are valuable analytical generalizations that can be drawn from 
the study.  
 
(i) Leaving, returning and staying away: researching migration in an uncertain world 
 
These were the rudiments of our methodology. What such an account glosses over, however, are 
the particular challenges that we faced. In essence, we were interested in exploring migration and 
return, and the insights that migration provides into whether villagers are able, through their 
migration experiences, to successfully negotiate the middle-income trap. Yet, many of our subjects 
were still absent from their natal villages and among those who had returned there was the 
possibility that they might leave on a future sojourn. Furthermore, for those who were absent we 
had to rely on their families’ assessment as to whether their migration was temporary or permanent 
and, of course, there was the very real chance that a temporary sojourn might become permanent. 
Chance meetings and serendipitous or untoward events have a habit of up-turning the most 
carefully strategized life course. Two examples illustrate these challenges and the uncertainties that 
underpin our research. 
 
In a focus group meeting (12.1.13) undertaken in one of our villages after the conclusion of our 
survey questionnaire, we met a woman who had returned to Ban Don after almost forty years’ 
absence. She had left the village as a temporary labor migrant and worked as a housemaid in 
Bangkok. During this time she fell in love and married, and because she and her husband chose to 
build their lives away from Ban Don her temporary absence became, it seemed, permanent. Her 
husband, however, died in 2007/8 and on his death she decided to return ‘home’ to Ban Don. 
Shortly thereafter she met and married a Ban Don resident and become, once again, a ‘villager’.  The 
second example is of a man who left Ban Mai in the early 1970s, initially as a temporary migrant. 
While he was working in the northern province of Lampang he met a woman, they married, settled 
in the area and raised a family. At this point, as far as his relations in Ban Mai knew, he had left the 
village on a permanent basis. But he then left his wife and returned to the village. When we 
undertook our survey in 2012 he was once more absent from Ban Mai, working as a carpenter in 
Cambodia. But when we returned to the village to undertake a follow-up survey in 2013, he had 
returned once more. As this man was now in his 60s, we have assumed that he is now permanently 
residing (back) in Ban Mai. That said, there is always the possibility that his migration story might 
take yet another surprising turn. 
 
Of all our 151 migrants, 51 had returned home at the time of the survey; another  61 – but bearing in 
mind the impossibility of being certain that a migrant is only a sojourner – were regarded by their 
natal households as temporarily absent (Table 5). In total, therefore, only 26 per cent of our 
migrants were regarding by their families as permanently absent and, furthermore, approaching half 
of these were marriage migrants. To put it another way, and discounting marriage migrants, 85 per 
cent of migrants had or were expected to return to their villages of origin. Migration from these 
three villages for the very large majority has been, and appears to remain, a temporary sojourn. 
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In a paper drawing on a panel database of 2,000 rural households collected from 2008 to 2010 in 
three provinces in the Northeast (Buriram, Nakhon Phanom and Ubon Ratchathani) complemented 
by a survey in 2010 of 650 migrants in Bangkok, Amare et al. write: “For migrants, the rural 
household remains the nucleus. Mostly, migrants are still members of the rural household regardless 
of their duration of absence, frequency of home visits, or place of official registration” (2012, p. 1). 
Following the 2008 global financial crisis, Thailand’s National Statistical Office undertook a dry 
season survey in 2009 to gauge the rate of return of seasonal migrants in the light of an economic 
downturn and found that 74 per cent of rural migrants’ most recent move was to return home 
(Huguet et al., 2012; and see Piriya Pholphirul, 2012). 
 
The two returnee migrant cases of ours recounted above may be unusual (although not exceptional), 
but they do highlight the point that making a clear distinction between ‘temporary’ and ‘permanent’ 
is problematic. And yet, and as the paper will show, drawing this line is important for the argument 
we make which concerns the ties that migrants have to their natal villages. We address this 
challenge by taking the household as the initial entry point, not the migrant (whether current or 
returned). We then reconstruct the evolving migration ‘signature’ of each household. This gives us a 
sense of whether households are spatially fragmenting in a more enduring sense under the influence 
of migration, or whether the household and village remain continuing places of return. This then 
permits us to discuss the livelihood trajectories of returnee migrants and to consider the middle-
income trap in light of their decisions and experiences. 
 
4. MIGRANTS, MIGRATION AND THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 
 
We see in the experiences of the three study villages the middle-income trap writ small. In 1975 
these villages were still very largely farming communities: farming delivered both the subsistence 
needs of the inhabitants and the limited income required to buy goods and pay for services that 
could not be provided through own-account, farm-based activities. Engagement with the world 
beyond the village although not rare, was limited in both its regularity and its intensity. The villagers 
were low income and the incidence of poverty high; even the non-poor were far from being wealthy 
and lived meagre lives. From around 1980 this began to change as access improved, needs escalated 
and opportunities beyond the village expanded. Circular labor migration became a key means to 
address this changing livelihood context. Thailand’s rapid economic growth, both a product and a 
cause of agrarian changes in villages such as these, led to many younger women and men leaving the 
village to access the opportunities that industrialization was making available. By the 1990s the 
villages had achieved lower middle-income status, and poverty had been largely eradicated. In line, 
however, with the middle-income trap, while migration may have played a pivotal role in lifting the 
population of the villages out of poverty, most inhabitants remained – and remain – engaged in low 
or semi-skilled, and low wage work whether in the farm or non-farm sectors (see Table 4). The 
villages’ escape from the poverty trap, like Thailand’s, was rapid; but negotiating the middle-income 
trap has proved to be more intractable. 
 
We sought to understand the personal nature of the middle-income trap through the experiences of 
first and second generation migrants in the three villages (Table 6). We identified first generation 
migrants – some 54 individuals in total – as those who had begun their migrant sojourn during the 
early years of Thailand’s ‘miracle’ industrialization. We took this to span the years between the mid-
1970s and the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (Figure 3). Our second generation migrants, 
numbering 97, were those who had left after 1997. The selection of these two periods was not 
arbitrary; the migration era in all three villages really took off in the early 1980s and the great 
majority of migrants were young and single. Their children entered adulthood and became our 
second generation migrants from around 2000. These two periods are also neatly separated by the 
Asian economic crisis. Finally, 1997 was the year when the government made the completion of 
lower secondary school compulsory, taking the period of compulsory education from six to nine 
years. Even so, this periodization is only approximate; Thailand’s industrialization and transitions in 
the villages have continuously evolved during the period under investigation, and of course continue 
to do so. The generational make-up of the villages is also not as ‘lumpy’ as presented by this 
first/second generation divide and, moreover, there was also some migration before 1975. 
Nonetheless, it serves our purpose in seeking to understand how improving education, growing 
opportunities and changing livelihoods intersect over time, and how households and individuals 
have adjusted their livelihood activities in response. 
 
[TABLE 6 AND FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
(a) First generation migrants: riding the coat-tails of Thailand’s economic miracle? 
 
In 1987 when the World Bank first introduced its country income classifications, Thailand was 
already a middle-income country. At that time, however, the incidence of poverty in the country was 
still high: some 17 per cent of the population were living on less than $1.25 per day, and 41 per cent 
on less than $2 per day.vi In the Northeastern region the poverty figures would have been 
considerably higher still given the generally poorer living conditions in the region compared to the 
nation as a whole.vii The first generation migrants in our study were most certainly not middle-
income – although they very much desired to become so – and their migration, primarily to Bangkok 
and provinces in the Central Plains as well as overseas, was driven by the wish to better themselves. 
It may not have been distress-induced, but it was development-driven. The large majority of our 
respondents (almost 70 per cent) had only primary level education, and just 15 per cent were 
educated to upper secondary level. None had an education higher than this (Figure 4). Their skills 
were very largely limited to farming and their work prospects in Thailand’s burgeoning non-farm 
sector restricted to, for instance, domestic work, construction, low skill/low wage factory 
employment, and various informal sector activities (see Table 3).  
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
These migrants’ prospects were limited by their human capital, but their aspirations were also 
limited. Their migration was motivated by a desire to earn income to meet growing needs: a new 
house, a motorbike, a television, the means to pay for electricity, and the wish that they might be 
able to support their children in secondary and perhaps higher education. Returns to farming were 
being squeezed just as opportunities in the non-farm sector and beyond the Northeast region were 
growing. Migration became the logical, indeed arguably the only answer to this scissor effect of 
stagnating returns to work in farming locally and expanding opportunities in the non-farm sector 
extra-locally. But it is important to note that their engagement in ex situ non-farm work was not 
seen by these migrants as transformational in the long term. They left as farmers and their wish and 
their expectation was that they would return ‘home’ and, they thought, re-engage with farming. This 
is also how it mostly turned out. In the following paragraph, we recount the summary migration 
stories of four first generation villagers which encapsulate the experiences and returns to work for 
many of these early migrants. 
 
Mr C. (BNDM#04, 7.2.2013) left Ban Mai in 1992 at the age of 37 and was recruited to work in an 
iron foundry in South Korea. Two years later he moved to Taiwan and was employed on a road 
construction gang. He returned home in 1997 after five years overseas and picked up where he had 
left off: farming rice and sugar cane, and raising cattle. He did not deploy any of the skills he had 
acquired overseas but the money he earned did enable him to clear his debts, build a new house 
and, most importantly, pay for his daughter to go to university. He told us with some satisfaction: 
I’m very proud of myself in working for my daughter’s [benefit], and watching her achieve success in 
getting a bachelor degree from university. Mr M. (BDH#11, 12.1.2013) was 39 years old at the time 
of our interview in 2013, and he had migrated for the first time in 1993 at the age of 19 when he left 
Ban Don to work in a roller blade manufacturing company in Samut Prakan province, outside 
Bangkok. He resigned after two years and took up work as a laborer in Khon Kaen City, where he 
worked for seven years, before returning to Bangkok. Fearful of the chemicals he had heard were 
used in some factories, he decided to work for a company making blankets. But dissatisfied with the 
salary he received, Mr M. quit and quickly moved to take up employment in a luggage-making 
factory, also in Samut Prakan province. He resigned from this position after three years and, in 2007, 
after 14 years working away from home, returned to Ban Don. Over the course of his migrant career 
he had learned a number of skills from stocktaking to a range of basic computer applications, as well 
as becoming adept in various manual functions. But on his return he was not able to put these to 
any great use. He worked in a sports garment factory in neighboring Chumpae district, then in a 
chicken slaughterhouse, and finally set up on his own, working from home making and selling grilled 
pork balls. He admitted to us that the skills he had acquired during his 14 year sojourn were of little 
use back in the village. Mr. B. (BDH#12, 12.1.2013) worked for 14 years in various construction jobs 
until he returned to Ban Don in 2006 at the age of 47. Despite learning how to work with cement 
and plaster and becoming skilled in carpentry and welding he told us that he did not put these 
talents to productive use in the village. He was now too old, he said, to take on the hard work of 
construction and so he went back to rice and sugarcane farming. Finally, there was Mrs S. (BN#01, 
7.1.2013) from Ban Na. She left her village at the age of 18 and travelled to Bangkok where she 
worked in a bakery. She then became a house maid for three years, also in the capital, followed by 
another three years in Chantaburi, a province close to Cambodia on the eastern seaboard. She then 
applied for a job as a maid in Hong Kong where she learnt Cantonese and worked for two families 
before returning in 2002 at the age of 33 having been away from the village for 15 years. In Mrs S.’s 
case, migration was a route out of poverty. As she told us: “Both I and my husband started with zero 
(we had nothing). Now, I have saved enough money to build a house.” 
 
These experiences were characteristic of our first generation migrants. They did in the main enjoy 
the challenge of working away from home, the buzz of the city and the satisfaction of making new 
friends from distant places, and of having ‘got by’ in a new environment. They thought the 
experience had made them more resilient and resourceful, and they spoke with some pride about 
the skills they had acquired: seamstressing, masonry work, welding, cooking, new language skills, 
driving and using machinery, and carpentry, for instance. But in the main these experiences had not 
led to the acquisition of skills that could be easily transferred and re-deployed in the village. The one 
exception to this was gem stone cutting in Ban Don which, for a very short time – just three to four 
years – became an exemplar case of rural industrialization, employing not just many local resident 
villagers but also sucking in labor from surrounding settlements (see Promsaka Na Sakolnakorn et al., 
2010; Parnwell, 1990). As 32 year-old Mrs. B. from Ban Na explained to us when she recounted her 
time working in Bangkok: I have not used any of my skills from working in Bangkok at home. It is a 
different kind of work [to here in the village] (7.1.2013). Mr B. who left the village in 1980 at the age 
of 24 to work on a construction site was even more forthright: Working outside the community was 
not good to me. I did it just to raise the standard of living for me and my family, but [even so] I am 
not rich (BDH#5, 12.1.2013). The bulk of migrants returned from their migrant sojourns, most having 
made and saved a reasonable sum of money and with a degree of pride in their adventure and 
sacrifice, to return to growing rice, cutting cane and raising cattle.  
 
These first generation migrants were, indeed, ‘trapped’ – but, importantly, this was mainly by 
choice. In theory it might have been possible for them to continue their education, acquire various 
vocational qualifications, or up-skill and up-grade into better paid work. In practice they were unable 
or chose not to do any of these things; just one of the 54 first generation migrants acquired 
additional educational qualifications post-migration. They mostly left as farmers with a bare level of 
education; and they returned with a bare level of education and, if they had acquired skills through 
their work experiences, these rarely led to any change in their work patterns or prospects. Some 60 
per cent of first generation migrants reported that their migration experience had led to no useful 
skills acquisition that could be deployed back in their villages. Given that they had, on average, 
worked away from home for 19 years this failure to translate work experience into skills that could 
be harnessed post-migration reveals the limited degree to which such work led to a transformation 
in occupation and, therefore, livelihoods and income. 
 
The education of most first generation migrants to primary level was, therefore, carried with them 
from childhood through to middle age. The Thai government has been singularly poor at promoting 
adult education and we can therefore, in part, see the country’s continuing middle-income status as 
a high order reflection of the ‘trapped’ status of migrants from villages such as these in Khon Kaen 
(see Varakorn Samkoset, 2010; Vidhyakorn Chiangkoon, 2010; Somchai Jitsuchon, 2012). Mrs P. was 
38 years old when we interviewed her at the start of 2013, married with two children aged 18 and 7 
years old. Mrs P. left Ban Mai in 1991 after finishing Grade 9 (lower secondary school) and went to 
Bangkok to work in a watch factory. She returned two years later in 1993 with a yearning to pick up 
her studies again and go to university. Her parents, though, did not support Mrs P. in her plans, 
arguing that she was too old to go back to studying. She told us: I still need many things. I want a 
new house, and wait to see my children graduate and have their own job (BNDM#5, 31.1.2013). Mrs 
P.’s educational ambitions were being thwarted not just by her parents’ reluctance to support her, 
but also by the cash needs of the wider household. The personal development trajectories of the 
households we surveyed, then, suggest that they – and by extension Thailand – will need to wait 
quite some while before they can finally ‘escape’ into work that might deliver high incomes. 
 
It needs to be acknowledged however that livelihood transformation – a necessary component of 
escaping the middle-income trap – was never on the agenda for most of these migrants, Mrs P.’s 
aspirations notwithstanding. Their allegiance was not to a new life, but to an old one. Migration was 
a means to keep people in the village, and not – paradoxically – to take them out of the village. Non-
farm work, at a household level, was inter-leaved with farm work. The emergence of multi-sited 
households (see Rigg et al., 2012; Rigg and Salamanca, 2011) and the shift to new forms of pluri-
activity (or occupational multiplicity) reflected the fact that these migrants were not in the business 
of escaping their farming origins and occupations but, rather, complementing and supporting them. 
In the three villages a remarkably small number of individuals have actually ‘escaped’ the village by 
embarking on a career trajectory that would lead them outwards from their villages and upwards 
into higher return work. Many of those who have left permanently have done so on marriage, 
moving to neighboring settlements with livelihood, resource and education profiles close to those 
described here.viii  
 
There is, though, a generational wrinkle to the middle-income trap story that we outline for first 
generation migrants. We show how the first generation migrants, as a group, largely failed to move 
into higher skilled, higher value added, and higher wage activities. To some extent, this was to be 
expected; these migrants had limited education and were, in a real sense, peasant sojourners. But a 
significant proportion of the income they earned from their migration sojourn was invested in the 
education of their children. Our first generation migrants may have had only primary level education 
(four [until 1977] or six years of education);ix their children, however, benefitted from the extension 
of compulsory schooling from four years to six years of primary level schooling in 1977, and then, in 
1997, to six years of primary followed by three years of lower secondary education. Two years later, 
in 1999, the Thai state introduced 12 years of ‘free’ basic education, albeit with only the first nine 
years being compulsory.x Most recently, in 2009, the Thai government announced 15 years of free 
provision of state education from kindergarten to upper secondary level. In addition to this 
cumulative extension and upgrading of state provision, the first generation migrant parents of 
second generation migrants have channelled a significant slice of remitted income into the further 
and higher education of their children. Could it, we wondered, be in the inter-generational 
investment of income earned through migration in the education of the next generation that escape 
from the middle-income trap would be secured?  
 
(b) Second generation migrants: escaping the middle-income trap? 
 
As Figure 3 shows, while seven out of ten first generation migrants had only primary level education, 
more than half of second generation migrants were educated to secondary level, or above. 
Furthermore, if we look at whether second generation migrants have further improved their 
education status post-migration, then there is even more room for optimism: a number of migrants 
completed higher level degrees on their return. Do we see here, therefore, individuals and families 
escaping the middle-income trap partially through state educational investments and partially by the 
inter-generational transfer of resources? Is there evidence to suggest that the hard work and 
sacrifices of the first generation have enabled the second generation to acquire the education to 
raise their occupational prospects, and therefore the livelihood prospects of their wider families?    
 
Unfortunately, the data do not give much reason to be sanguine about these households’, and 
therefore Thailand’s, immediate prospects. To begin with, it does not seem that their higher 
education levels have been translated into significantly higher skill, greater value added and 
therefore higher wage work. Indeed, rather the reverse: while the first generation migrants were 
being retrained from farmers into workers, and up-skilled in the process, second generation 
migrants were, if anything, being de-skilled as their secondary level education led them only into 
relatively menial or semi-skilled factory work. Of the 28 second generation migrants who had either 
completed upper secondary level schooling or graduated with a degree, the majority either had 
remained as factory workers or taken on casual or farm work. 
 
An even larger proportion of second generation respondents than first generation migrants also felt 
that their migrant work experiences had not led to the acquisition of transferable skills: almost 
three-quarters said that their skills could not be valuably used on their return to the village. At first 
blush this is surprising. But we suggest that it reflects the way in which household livelihoods and 
the operation of the space economy have evolved, which has had the effect of hindering escape 
from the middle-income trap. There has been a partial rather than a complete dislocation of the 
rural population from the countryside: women and men engage with the industrial and service 
sectors, but mainly while also maintaining links with their natal villages and with farming. The higher 
the skill level of a migrant villager, the farther removed she or he is from the working context of the 
village. The continuing connection of migrants with their natal villages, and the longer they remain 
connected to the village, the harder it is for young villagers to cash in their education in employment 
terms. To do so, they need to remain absent and commit fully with the knowledge economy of the 
city. The fact that three-quarters of second generation migrants found that their skills had no utility 
in the village, as opposed to under 60 per cent of first generation migrants, reflects the growing 
separation between the working context of the village and the wider, non-farm economy. The first 
generation migrants were returning with manual skills – working with cement, welding, carpentry, 
seamstressing, driving and such like – which sometimes could be usefully deployed in the village; 
second generation migrants were more likely to be returning with skills and experiences that did not 
have such an obvious application in the village – electronics assembly and car part production, for 
example. One conclusion that might be drawn, then, is that so long as the younger generation 
remain beholden to their village origins, they will also remain trapped, unable fully to deploy their 
skills and education. 
 
There has, to be sure, been some decentralization of industry in Thailand to rural areas as 
diseconomies of scale in the core have intensified. Nonetheless, over half of manufacturing remains 
concentrated in Bangkok and adjacent provinces (Apisek Pansuwan, 2010) and, more to the point, 
those industries that have located in peripheral regions such as the Northeast tend to be low skilled 
and low wage: agro-industries, wood-based manufacturing, garment and footware factories, and 
food and beverage industries, for example. The one area which has seen a significant growth of 
higher technology industries is the Eastern Seaboard (between Chonburi and Rayong – see Figure 2) 
and these draw their labor mainly from rural areas such as our study sites. 
 
In embracing and sustaining inter-locking livelihoods across spaces and sectors, villagers were not 
being capricious. Maintaining a presence in the village and on the land provides a degree of 
livelihood security; people well recalled the effects of the Thai financial crisis of 1997-1998 when the 
economy contracted by more than 10 per cent and many people were thrown out of work with little 
notice and no severance pay. In addition, however, the transition path mapped out in Thailand’s 
recent national development plans (see NESDB, 2011; and http://eng.nesdb.go.th/) is also one which 
has stressed the sufficiency economy (sethakit phor piang)xi (see UNDP, 2007) and the attractions of 
the village as the basis for livelihoods. While the villagers of Ban Don, Ban Na and Ban Mai were far 
from being rural romantics, they did see attractions in the resilience and security that came from 
maintaining a presence and an allegiance with their natal communities. They were also clear that 
village living had real attractions in social and cultural terms as well. Nonetheless this, in terms of the 
families that populate the villages, is a brake on escaping the middle-income trap because it limits 
the degree to which they can transform their livelihoods.  
 
Migrants who preferred the security of the village to the perceived perils of permanently leaving 
home were not, to reiterate, being whimsical; as Thailand has progressed, non-farm work has 
arguably become more precarious rather than less so. While there are definitional complications, the 
size of the informal sector in Thailand declined from 77 per cent of total employment in 1980 to 58 
per cent in 2000. Since 2000, however, it has risen again, to 63 per cent in 2012 (Hewison and 
Woradul Tularak, 2013, p.  450; NSO 2013). This has been put down to the growing informalisation 
of the formal sector, and with it growing precarity. The informal sector with characteristic informal 
enterprises has become, and not just in Thailand, informal working arrangements within the formal 
economy (Chen 2007). This became all too clear during the floods of 2011 when factories in the 
inundated Central Plains closed and were able easily to ‘release’ their workers who were employed 
on casual, often agency-tied, contracts (Hewison and Woradul Tularak, 2013, p.  445). These were 
just the jobs and employment arrangements that our second generation migrants were enduring.  
 
5. THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL 
 
As set out above, both the households and individuals that make up the three study settlements and 
the villages themselves can be seen to be caught in a manner that is quite similar to the middle-
income trap as set out in country-level economic analyses (Table 7). Having escaped poverty in the 
1980s as villagers engaged with the expanding non-farm sector, itself linked to Thailand’s export-
oriented, often FDI-driven industrialization, there has not then been a smooth progression into the 
skill intensive work that might have delivered high incomes. We explore this ‘stickiness’ in the 
transition process through the experiences of first and second generation migrants. For first 
generation migrants, their limited education has become a deep, seemingly unbridgeable barrier to 
their progression up the skills ladder. We see a three-fold failure operating here: the failure of the 
Thai government to provide adequate adult education and vocational training;xii a failure of firms to 
invest in the skills development of their workforces and to provide security of employment; and the 
failure of individuals to invest in and commit to their own educational development. What is clear is 
that for these first generation migrants, the trap is fairly intractable: it is not easy to see these 
former migrants, now in their 40s and 50s, providing the skills base for a future, high income Thai 
economy. Their time, in a sense, has passed. What, though, of the second generation migrants in 
their 20s and 30s? 
 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Here the evidence from Ban Don, Ban Na and Ban Mai is marginally more encouraging, although 
there are also reasons to be concerned. Certainly, these younger and more recent migrants are 
better educated and there is some evidence that their education and skills development continues 
post-migration. Rather than being tied educationally to the era when they left school, there are 
some signs of commitment to lifelong learning. That said, this is only for a small minority; just five of 
the 97 second generation migrants re-entered education following their migration sojourns. The 
demographic dividend that accompanied Thailand’s sharply falling total fertility rate from the 1970s 
has been only partially realised both because educational investments have not been as great as 
they might – and perhaps should – have been but also because employment opportunities for young 
adults, and especially in rural areas, have been largely limited to low and semi-skilled work (NTAB, 
2012, p. 7; Rigg, 2012, pp. 148-153).  
 
We also tentatively make the argument, and we realise that this will be contentious given debates at 
the national level over the desired path of development in Thailand, that the prevalence of multi-
sited livelihoods and households where the village remains a place of return, retirement and, at 
times of crisis, refuge is a further barrier to these individuals negotiating the transition from semi-
skilled to high-skilled, and therefore from middle-income to high income. It is not infrequently 
suggested that the problem of the middle-income trap lies primarily in an educational failure both in 
terms of level (years) and quality (Warr, 2011, p. 5; and see Pasuk Phongpaichit, 2011). It may be, 
however, that the problem is more complex than this: that there is a demand as well as a supply 




The issue of the middle-income trap has attracted a great deal of policy attention. There is concern 
not only that some countries may take far longer than expected to achieve high income status, but 
that other hitherto rapidly-expanding countries, most notably China (Ajami, 2013; Eichengreen et al., 
2011; Zhuang et al., 2012) and Vietnam (Ohno, 2009) are also at risk of becoming trapped.   
 
What does this research mean for policy and for wider understandings of the middle-income trap? In 
terms of policy it highlights an issue that is already well appreciated: that there needs, 
notwithstanding the point made in the last section, to be greater investment in educating or skilling 
that portion of the population who may have left education after lower secondary school – and who 
account for the majority of our second generation migrants. The trend towards greater 
informalisation of work in the formal sector is also a barrier to sustained, long-term engagement 
with the industrial and service sectors. We also suggest that more attention needs to be paid to the 
intersection between skills and education on the one hand and the continuing role of the village as 
the fulcrum around which rural society and household livelihoods are arrayed, on the other. We are 
fully aware of the attractions of this village-focused approach to building sustainable and resilient 
societies, but also note that this may be another factor that limits people’s ability to engage fully 
with the knowledge economy. 
 
Certainly, the connection between urban migrants from rural areas and their home villages is a 
continuing feature of rural-urban relations in middle-income Asia (Douglass, 2006; Nguyen et al., 
2006) and can be seen reflected in work on China (Xiang, 2007; Zhu, 2007), India (Deshingkar and 
Start, 2003) and Vietnam (Resurreccion and Van Khanh, 2007). In taking such an approach to life and 
living, migrants and their families may be seeking to protect what they have while pursuing what 
they do not, and in so doing securing a degree of resilience in a context where employment in the 
formal economy is become more precarious (Hewison and Kalleberg 2013). But they are also, 
arguably, compromising their opportunities for upward mobility. A key issue is whether such 
spatially divided loyalties, split households and multi-sited livelihoods will endure.  
 
In the meantime, however, these three villages give some insight into why escaping middle-income 
status is so intractable: it involves not just companies embracing new technologies and governments 
investing in training and education, but individuals investing the time to develop their human capital 
and having the confidence to embrace life and living away from their home villages. For our second 
generation migrants it was not clear whether this was a justifiable option given their attachment to 
their rural homes and the way in which this then limited their options. The three villages that we 
studied may be places to leave but they have not become places to leave behind; rather, they are 
places to return to. Rural resilience and on-going connection, however, has come at a price. 
Personalising the middle-income trap as we have sought to do in this paper indicates that 
individuals’ life course decisions, just as much as state policies and firms’ strategies, have played a 
role in constraining the transition to high skilled – and therefore high income – occupations. The 
middle-income trap, then, is as much personal as it is structural and institutional.  
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Table 1: Stages of growth and the middle-income trap in Southeast Asia, 1987-2011 





Singapore    1987-2011 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
   1987-2011 
Malaysia   1987-2011  
Thailand  1987-2009 2010-2011  
Vietnam  1987-2008 2008-2011  
Philippines  1987-2011   
Indonesia 1987-2002 2003-2011   
Timor Leste 2002-2006 2007-2011   
Lao PDR 1987-2009 2010-2011   
Cambodia 1987-2011    
Myanmar 1987-2011    
 
Note: these analytical income categories were produced by the World Bank and date from 1989 
when the Bank was able to establish a benchmark ($6,000) between middle-income and high-
income countries at 1987 prices. At that time, in 1987, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam were both 
already classified as High income, Malaysia as Upper middle-income, and Thailand, Vietnam and the 
Philippines as Lower middle-income.  
 
Source: World Bank data accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/a-
short-history.  
  




Personal level Evidence from the Thai research villages 
State failure Failure to provide 
sufficient support for 
education to significantly 
raise human capital 
Among first generation migrants, just 15 per cent 
had upper secondary level education or above; for 
second generation migrants the figure was 29 per 
cent 
Firm failure Failure of firms either to 
raise the skills of their 
workforces or to deploy 
the human capital that 
they have to its full 
potential 
Labor migrants from the three villages were largely 
employed in low skill, low wage work. Even when 
employment extended over ten years or more, 
there was little evidence of firms investing in skills 
development and upgrading. Few workers were in 
secure employment 
Social failure Failure of the population 
to deploy their human 
capital to its full potential 
First generation, but particularly second generation 
migrants showed little success in deploying and 
generating a return from their education. First 
generation migrants did not see their migration as 
transformational; it served a purpose but did not – 
and was not expected to – lead to a long term 
change in living patterns and livelihoods. Second 
generation migrants’ enduring connection with 
their natal villages acted to limit their engagement 
with higher skill occupations. Around 85 per cent of 
migrants returned to their natal villages 
 
  
Table 3 Household livelihoods and living, Ban Don, Ban Na and Ban Mai, Khon Kaen, Thailand 
(2012) 
Indicator 2012 
% of households with agricultural land 81% 
% of households with rice land 79% 
Average area of land owned (hectares) 1.9 
Average area of rice land owned (hectares) 1.7 
Average number of household members living in the village  3.9 
Average number of household members living away from the 
village 
1.2 
% household heads with migration experience 75% 
 
Source: survey questionnaire; n = 105 
  
Table 4: Village profiles 
 Ban Don (Nong Rua 
District) 
Ban Na (Nong Rua 
District) 
Ban Mai (Ban Fang 
District) 
Households 155 134 86 
Population 708 685 277 
Main occupations in 
the past 
Farm: rice, cattle 
raising 
Farm: rice, cattle 
raising  
Farm: rice, cattle 
raising 
Main occupations 
today (village based 
and local) 








Farm: rice, sugar cane  
Non-farm: fishnet 
making, sugar factory 
work 
Farm: rice, sugarcane  
Non-farm: textile 
factory work, shoe 
factory work, 
construction 
Date of onset of first 
migrant stream 
1970 1977 1975 
Main first generation 
migrant occupations 
Women: gemstone 
cutting, factory work, 
work in the sugar case 
fields, candle making  
Men: ice cream selling 
in Bangkok; gemstone 







textile factory work 
Men: construction 
work (carpenter, 
mason) overseas and 
in Bangkok, driver 
Women: house 
maids/domestic work, 
textile factory work, 









Women: factory work 




factory work in 
Bangkok, Chonburi, 
Samut Prakarn and 
Taiwan; casual work in 
Khon Kaen  
Women: factory work 
in Bangkok, Chonburi, 
Malaysia 
Men: factory work in 
Bangkok, Rayong; 
construction work in 
Bangkok, Brunei; own 
business in Bangkok 
Women: factory work 
in Bangkok, Taiwan, 
Korea; construction 
work in Bangkok 
Men: casual work in 
Bangkok, Samut 
Prakarn, Lopburi; 




34 41 30 
In-depth interviews 
(n) 
15 15 15 
First generation 
migrants surveyed (n) 
20 22 12 
Second generation 
migrants surveyed (n) 
35 40 22 
 
Source: household surveys and interviews, 2012 and 2013 
  
Table 5: Leaving and returning: households’ evolving migration signatures 
  Migrants Returnees 





regarded by their 
families as permanently 















1974-1979 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1980-1984 10 6 1 1 2 30 20 
1985-1989 10 7 0 1 2 20 20 
1990-1994 27 15 5 4 3 25.9 11.1 
1995-1999 38 12 16 5 5 26.3 13.2 
2000-2004 21 3 14 2 2 19.0 9.5 
2005-2009 32 7 16 3 6 28.1 18.8 
2010-2012 11 0 8 1 2 27.3 18.2 
Total 151 51 61 17 22 25.8 14.6 
 
Source: main survey (2012) and follow-up survey (2013) 
  
Table 6: Characteristics of first and second generation migrants 
 First generation migrants Second generation migrants 
Age at migration 25.1 23.5 
Years away 18.7 9.4 
Education on 
migration 
% primary 68.5 42.3 






% primary 68.5 42.3 





Note: the lower years away for second generation migrants reflect the continuing absence of many; 
their migration sojourn has not ended. 




Table 7: Navigating the middle-income trap: scales of transition 








1960    -    1970    -    1980    -    1990    -    2000    -    2010    -    2020    -    2030 
Country level 
income category 










Second generation migrants 



























rising wages  
























































mobile living and 
livelihoods; pluri-
active livelihoods 
with farming as 
subsidiary 
activity 
Personal level Primary level 
education (4 
years); limited 





high incidence of 
poverty or near 
poverty 
Lower secondary 









poverty but still 
Lower (9 years) 


















Figure 1: Income sources, Ban Dong Daeng 1981 and 2002 (per cent) 






















Figure 2: Thailand 




Figure 3: Date of initial departure of first and second generation migrants 















 Figure 4: Educational status of first and second generation migrants on departure (%) 





i See, for example: Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2009a and 2009b; Zhuang et al., 2012; Ohno, 2009; Jankowska et al., 
2012.  
ii Extrapolating back from 1987, Zhuang et al. (2012, p. 9) calculate that 18 of these 28 countries were middle-
income in 1962 – meaning that they have been trapped for half a century. 
iii Brunei Darrusalam is also high income but has achieved this on the basis of being oil rich, and on these 
grounds is discounted here. 
iv Between 1979 and 1981 wages increased to such an extent that labor costs were increasing by 12-16 per 
cent per year. This was intentionally designed to push out inefficient, low wage, low skill, labor intensive 
enterprises (Chowdhury and Kirkpatrick, 1987, p. 916). 
v These cash crops were not cultivated in place of (subsistence) glutinous rice but in addition to rice. They were 
mainly planted on upland too sandy and dry for wet rice farming and which was formerly used for grazing and 
the collection of forest products. 
vi These figures are for 1988. Accessed from http://data.worldbank.org/country/thailand.  




















                                                                                                                                                                                    
vii In 1986, 41 per cent of the population in the Northeast were recorded as living below the national poverty 
line, while the figure for the country as a whole was 26 per cent (Rigg, 2003, p. 99). 
viii One exception was a family from Ban Na who set themselves up as subcontractors linking garment factories 
in Bangkok with homeworkers in Ban Na and other nearby settlements. 
ix Four years of compulsory primary level education was introduced in 1921 with the promulgation of the 
Compulsory Primary Education Act. This did not become de facto effective countrywide until many years later, 
however.  
x ‘Free’ is put in quotation marks here because in rural areas access to upper secondary school requires 
children leaving their villages, incurring considerable costs for parents. 
xi The sufficiency economy has been the underpinning philosophy of Thailand’s national development strategy 
since it was first introduced in the 8th five-year plan (1997-2001). 
xii The current 11th (2012-2016) national development plan devotes a chapter to ‘sustainable lifelong learning’ 
(NESDB, 2011) which notes that “vocational education… [is] …not relevant to labor market demand” (page 45) 
and recommends “a process of continuous study [and] skill development… [to] adapt to global changes in the 
21st century” (page 48). “Vocational qualification standards should be upgraded”, and “education and 
competency qualifications [should be] linked to demand to produce employees for specific career paths” (page 
53). 
